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Book Review
Labyrinth: A Search for the Hidden Meaning of Science. Peter Pesic. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000,
186 pp. 
The “Human Meaning” of Science1
Peter Pesic deserves praise for this readable presentation of his research on “the human significance
of science.”2 In the first section of my review I outline Pesic’s story about the role a particular
metaphor—that “nature has secrets”3 —has played in the history of science’s evolving “human
meaning.”4 I organize this outline around my claim that, Pesic’s own protestations notwithstanding,
his book should be taken as a genuine piece of philosophy. In the second section of the review I
argue that Pesic’s work, philosophical though it may be, nevertheless suffers from some significant
structural tensions—in particular between the legitimacy of the “secrets in nature” metaphor and the
justification for attending as he does to the literary details of scientific work.
* * * * *
So, this book is not a work either of the history of science or of the philosophy of
science in their usual modern senses. … I will read scientific works as if they were
works of literature, attending to nuance and tone as much as to surface meaning, trying
to be faithful to them. These are works of thought and feeling that call for the evocation
of their largest questions…. Like great works of literature, great scientific writings have
a compelling integrity and imaginative force that call for sensitive reading. In this spirit,
I try to find the living center of human concern as it emerges in the scientific endeavor.
Though I cannot claim to be a philosopher in the deepest sense, I invite the reader to a
philosophical quest.5
Perhaps Pesic hesitates to call himself a philosopher because he lacks the professional philosopher’s
conceptual toolbox, but I propose that he deserves the title anyway. He deserves it not because his
book is thoroughly successful at accomplishing his goal of finding “the living center of human
concern as it emerges in the scientific endeavor”—in fact, I think it is not. Rather, he deserves the
title on the basis of his ability to write in a multi-layered way about questions of general human
significance.
By calling Pesic’s work multi-layered (and thus, in my view, philosophical), I mean that it is
written for as encompassing an audience as possible. While the book is in the first instance a
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popular work in what looks like intellectual history—Pesic traces the evolution of the “hidden
meaning” idea through the history of science from about the mid-16th Century through the 20th—it
is based on scholarship of staggering breadth, apparently designed to appeal at once to the casual
reader as well as to the scholar. Pesic seems consciously to give the reader a broad spectrum of
avenues to pursue for further study, even while keeping his prose almost fiercely accessible. Thus,
the work is multi-layered in the sense that, unlike most academic popularizations, it tries to
embrace both the professional and the non-professional audience at once,6 functioning as inspiring
story about scientific discovery for some readers, and for others as scholarly research into
something like the psychology of scientific advancement. I think Pesic counts as “a philosopher in
the deepest sense” because he writes for such a wide audience about an activity that has such
significance in our cultural milieu.
Pesic restricts his attention to six main players—William Gilbert, the 16th Century inventor of the
scientific study of magnetism; François Viète, the 16th Century mathematician who helped
introduce algebra to the Western world, and who was one of the first to develop systematic
codebreaking methods; Francis Bacon, the Lord Chancellor of England, pioneer of scientific
methodology in the late 16th and 17th Centuries, and the main protagonist of Labyrinth; and the
more widely-known scientists Johannes Kepler, Isaac Newton, and Albert Einstein.
Though Labyrinth features some detailed investigations of the above-mentioned scientists’ more
literary works (sometimes these are just journal or notebook musings), the book is organized
topically. Pesic, a tutor and musician-in-residence at St. John’s College in Santa Fe, calls his book a
“triple fugue, an interweaving of three distinct but finally interrelated themes concerning the
character of the scientific enterprise and the deep effects it has on human character.”7 The themes
are supposed to spell out three ways in which scientists who regarded nature as harboring secrets
have conceived of and practiced their craft. The first theme concerns the mutual struggle between
the scientist and nature; the second concerns the effect this struggle has on the scientist; and the
final theme concerns the rise of symbolic mathematics.
There is not an inkling of Labyrinth’s lynchpin claim, however, until more than halfway through
the book. The claim is that it was through the parallel developments during the 16th and 17th
Centuries of formal methods in cryptanalysis (codebreaking) and in symbolic mathematics,
especially algebra, that the metaphor of “secrets in nature” finally manifested itself in concrete
scientific practice.8 In the book’s most intriguing chapter, and perhaps its most speculative as well,
Pesic contends that Bacon’s experimental “tables and arrangements of instances”9 of phenomena
were patterned after similar tables commonly used in cryptanalysis.10 He devotes the rest of the
book to exploring the role of cryptanalytic techniques in the development of formal mathematics,
and the role of formal mathematics (and thus of cryptanalysis) in science.11
It is this juxtaposition of early scientific method with early work in cryptanalysis that finally
clarifies what it is for scientists to view nature as if it has “hidden secrets.” But it is also this
juxtaposition that raises questions about Pesic’s justification for trying to understand scientific
practice via its “human significance.”
* * * * *
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Pesic’s scholarly approach is marked by a laudable attempt to use methods drawn from opposed
camps in science studies. For instance, his work is clearly informed by “outsider” sociology and
history of science insofar as he wants license both to study aspects of scientific practice (like the
role played by human desire) that the scientists themselves may have thought irrelevant to
supporting their larger projects,12 and also to arouse in the reader a fresh sense of wonder at stories
which may already be familiar.13 But yet he is not willing to abandon the “insider” perspective,
occasionally detouring into basic but technical details of such things as Viète’s algebraic
inventions14 and the cipher Bacon developed as a young man.15
To give another example, Pesic has clearly been influenced by three prominent feminist readings of
Bacon16 —in particular, by their common insistence on studying Bacon’s literary devices as a way
to understand his vision of a new scientific method. But Pesic has at the same time been influenced
by two criticisms of these feminist interpretations,17 and wants to hold that Bacon’s vision of a new
science is not ultimately gender-biased.18
However, Pesic is in some ways too aware of his own methodology. He seems bent on making the
work overly self-referentially consistent, in the sense that the book is supposed to exhibit some of
the methodological features of science as codebreaking that the work itself discloses. He writes:
As befits someone groping through a maze, I do not feel restricted in the way I search
for the center. The word clue originally meant the thread guiding one through a maze,
and I will present the clues as I find them, whether in Gilbert’s account of magnetism or
Bacon’s retold fables or Viète’s codebreaking. I will not present a continuous history or
offer an overview of scientific theories, although I will recount some elements of history
and of scientific theory along the way.19
But it is science that is supposed to resemble “groping through a maze”, and it’s far from clear why
a book in the history of science must follow scientific methodology. It would be as though we held
that the only way to write a history of jazz would be to play more jazz.
Actually, by itself this is not a criticism of Labyrinth—surely a successful history of scientific
method might employ the very methods it discloses, just as a musical performance could
conceivably be successful in some way at telling a historical story. The problem is that Pesic’s
“groping” style turns out to hinder rather than help his project. The book feels like it is patched
together out of loosely connected essays, and the reader is left at the end without knowing quite
what to make of Pesic’s analysis. What were we supposed to get out of this? Are Pesic’s
conclusions supposed to have some normative force for contemporary readers, such that we are
being implored to practice science ourselves as if it were an act of codebreaking? If so, Pesic does
not make it clear why it might somehow be helpful to use this metaphor when actually doing
science. If not, why should we care about this project? Is the book meant to be of interest only to
history buffs? I fear that a clear answer to these issues is sacrificed for the sake of Pesic’s desire to
“grope” around where his interest leads him rather than to find the resolve to pursue a clearer set of
research goals.
In the passage I cited at the beginning of my review, Pesic writes, “I will read scientific works as if
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they were works of literature, attending to nuance and tone as much as to surface meaning, trying to
be faithful to them.” Another way to see the problem with Pesic’s “groping” style is to point out
that scientific works are usually not taken to be works of literature in the usual sense of the word—
so what is the justification for reading them “as if” they were? With the arguable exception of some
of Bacon’s more fanciful pieces (like The New Atlantis), even after reading Pesic these works seem
not to emerge as particularly interesting pieces of literature in their own right.20 The scientific
works may provide some interesting clues to the psychology of some prominent scientific and
mathematical pioneers, and at least in this respect Pesic’s work is quite clever. But Labyrinth is not
supposed to aim at a psycho-history of science, and if it were he would have done better to focus
more steadily on traditionally biographical sources rather than looking to “literary” works alone.
Again, the reader wonders whether Pesic’s style of meandering where his interests lead don’t, over
the course of a book-length work, generate a rather aimless whole.
Pesic might reply that he did not set out to convince us that these scientists’ respective works could
be redefined or fully understood as works of literature. Maybe he set out only to use the literary
features of scientific writing to help us understand science as a human enterprise—perhaps we were
not supposed to value these writings as literary works in their own right at all. But here we run into
what I take to be a more serious problem with the work: the very metaphor of science as an attempt
to decode nature seems to go along with a hard-headed realism about the aim of science, and it is
difficult to reconcile this realism with a view that we have to understand the human significance of
scientific practice in order to understand science.
The philosopher Bas Van Fraassen gives the following influential, minimal formulation of scientific
realism:
Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like;
and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true. This is the correct
statement of scientific realism.21
Without entering into debates about realism and anti-realism in science, it seems uncontroversial
that the aim of science, for a realist, is to give us “a literally true story of what the world is like.”
Now, Pesic’s metaphor of science as an attempt to uncover secrets in nature presupposes that there
is some one story about “what the world is like” that is literally true, and that it is the aim of
science to discover that story. He writes:
The thread linking physics and religion [for Newton] seems to be finding the center of an
enigma through gauging the significance even of the smallest phrase. … In Newton’s
“Rules for interpreting the words and language in Scripture” neither prophecy nor its
interpretation was in any way rhapsodic or irrational. Among these self-imposed rules
Newton includes “to assign but one meaning to one place of Scripture, unless it be by
way of conjecture. . . . To keep as close as may be to the same sense of words, especially
in the same vision.22
For Newton, Scripture contained some one hidden meaning that had to be uncovered, and Pesic
argues that Newton, like many of the other scientists he discusses, saw nature in the same terms.23
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But now let us raise the question again of what significance Pesic’s study is supposed to have for
contemporary readers. I have been assuming that Pesic’s work is supposed to be more than an
interesting story about the psychological profiles of some prominent scientists through history. Let
us suppose this reading is correct. Then science should be practiced in a way that is somehow
analogous to codebreaking, and scientists must be realists—science should be an inquiry into what
is literally true about the world. Why? Because even if you don’t accept Pesic’s reading of Newton
or any of his other subjects, the view that there could be, say, multiple distinct “useful fictions”
about some one phenomenon is incompatible with the codebreaking metaphor—if you “break” the
code and find that your solution is ambiguous between two possible messages, you haven’t really
broken the code.
But then the crucial question again arises about the nature of Pesic’s project. If the codebreaking
comparison is to be taken seriously, what do we learn about science by studying its “human
significance”? With few exceptions, “one true story” stories must make matters of justification
independent of human interests—independent of “the merely personal”, in Einstein’s phrase.24 If
these stories are right, studies about science’s “human significance” will be irrelevant to our
understanding of how science functions, and Pesic’s work must be treated as of merely psycho-
historical interest.
Perhaps I have been wrong to assume that Pesic’s work is meant to be directly relevant to our
understanding of scientific practice. But again, as psycho-history, Labyrinth falls short. And then
we are left where we began, with the question of what interest his book is supposed to have for us
at all.
* * * * *
Despite my criticism, it is not as clear as I have pretended it to be that a “one true story” picture of
science is necessarily incompatible with anything but a view of justification that leaves human
motives out altogether. In fact, I think the relationship between science as a human enterprise and
science as a hard-nosed investigation into what the world is like (into breaking nature’s code, if you
like) is a very pregnant philosophical issue—one that Pesic’s research begs us to raise anew.
In the end, this issue is left to his readers, and maybe that is not so unreasonable. Labyrinth is well
worth reading—it is exhaustively researched, makes some truly original connections between
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to situate the book with respect to contemporary Bacon scholarship.
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it,” Pesic, Labyrinth 70. The best indirect evidence Pesic offers of Bacon’s awareness of
cryptanalysis is that he developed a cipher, or code, as a young man (pp. 65-67), and that his
brother Anthony was involved with cryptanalysis (p. 164). Note, though, that inventing a cipher is
not cracking one—Pesic’s conclusion would be on much firmer footing if Bacon had had experience
with formal methods of cryptanalysis, not just cryptography. I note that David Kahn, who wrote the
classic history of cryptography, and who Pesic praises as an authority, writes: “Cryptography and
cryptanalysis are sometimes called twin or reciprocal sciences, and in function they indeed mirror
one another. What one does the other undoes. Their natures, however, differ fundamentally.
Cryptography is theoretical and abstract. Cryptanalysis is empirical and concrete,” in The
Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967) 737. He
outlines some methodological differences between cryptography and cryptanalysis on 737-762.
11. The connection between cryptanalysis and formal mathematics in the work of François Viète is
made in Pesic, Labyrinth 73-83. The following and final three chapters trace the formal
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15. Pesic, Labyrinth 65-68. On the relative merits of “insider” and “outsider” approaches to science
studies, Pesic cites Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes,
Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). He writes: “My
approach has something of the ‘outsider’ as well as of the ‘insider’ …. Both perspectives are helpful
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19. Pesic, Labyrinth 6.
20. In his influential Literary Theory: An Introduction (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1983), Terry Eagleton suggests that “literature” can be understood as writing that is “highly valued”
in some particular way, without trying to specify some one way all literature is valued. He adds that
“Just as people may treat a work as philosophy in one century and as literature in the next, or vice
versa, so they may change their minds about what writing they consider valuable. They may even
change their minds about the grounds they use for judging what is valuable and what is not” (pp.
10-11). To put the matter simply, Pesic is not very convincing that we should take these works as
literature, though I don’t have space to defend my view here. Thanks to Natalia Ermolaev for
bringing Eagleton’s book to my attention, and for being so nice.
21. Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980) 8.
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